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ABSTRACT 
Shifts in the policy of the United States place renewed emphasis on countering 
near-peer adversaries. Evidence indicates that nations commonly create, sponsor, and 
support insurgencies as a tool of their foreign policy. If history predicts future events, 
then insurgency and counterinsurgency will continue through the 21st century. By 
evaluating the phases of the conflict in Afghanistan, this study sought to determine a way 
to organize and sequence the key principles of counterinsurgency to ensure the long-term 
attainment of national objectives. The study tested several hypotheses against historical 
cases wherein a host-nation received varying degrees of external support. If these 
hypotheses are valid, all the counterinsurgency victories would have followed a similar 
sequence through their phases. However, evaluation showed that while a few key 
principles must occur early in a COIN campaign, most counterinsurgencies achieve 
success differently. Though no one sequence emerged, the study determined which key 
principles the United States should accomplish first, and identifies several combinations 
of other counterinsurgency principles to systematically test to increase the chances of 
attaining U.S. national objectives in counterinsurgency efforts. 
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The United States National Security Strategy, signed in December 2017, shifts
strategic focus from non-state actors to adversarial state actors identified as revisionist 
states: the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and rogue states: Iran, 
and North Korea.1 With the pivot to great power competition, the United States must not 
neglect smaller conflicts that occur in emerging or embattled nations. Since World War II, 
insurgencies have been the most common form of global conflict.2 As countries seek to 
gain leverage over the United States, state-sponsored insurgencies will again become a 
strategic option, similar to how the Soviet Union sponsored insurgencies during the Cold 
War. While significant conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union included 
the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War, the United States 
countered other Soviet-sponsored insurgencies to prevent the spread of communism, and 
protect U.S. interests.3 Failed attempts by the United States to counter Soviet expansion 
around the world saw lasting negative consequences. As an example, in sub-Saharan Africa 
during the 1960s–1970s, the United States attempted to counter Soviet influence in Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.4 Of all the regions in the world 
affected by the spread of Communism, the United States lost its greatest political 
leverage in sub-Saharan Africa due to the failures in counterinsurgency efforts to deter 
Soviet expansion.
Similarly, violent Communist expansion occurred during the same period in Latin 
and South America in Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, 
1 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
2 T. X. Hammes, “Why Study Small Wars?,” Small Wars Journal 1 (April 2005): 1. 
3 James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-CLIO, 
2012), ix. 
4 Arnold and Wiener, Cold War, 6–8. 
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Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Colombia.5 However, the United States more successfully 
countered these insurgencies in all but Cuba due to the concerted diplomatic and military 
efforts applied in the region after lessons learned from the United States intervention in 
Vietnam.6 The 16 insurgencies identified in Africa and Latin and South America, 
regardless of scale, indicate that great power competition and insurgencies are invariably 
linked. In response to the future expected increase of state-sponsored insurgencies given 
this connection, the United States government, specifically the Department of State and 
Department of Defense would benefit from an increased understanding of how the key 
elements of a counterinsurgency campaign should be sequenced from pre-campaign 
conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term 
attainment of national objectives.  
Currently, U.S. guidance and doctrine from the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense does not specify a method to guide decisionmakers throughout the 
life-cycle of a counterinsurgency campaign. The lack of guidance contributes to the 
increasing costs paid in blood and treasure by the United States without attaining desired 
national objectives. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide outlines theoretical 
concepts and considerations for counterinsurgency, yet it fails to bridge theory and 
concepts into a logical sequence as evidenced by this passage from the manual:7  
Ideally, the overall COIN strategy should be devised by the affected nation, 
as their understanding of it and their commitment to it will be key to success. 
If possible, the role of the U.S. should, therefore, be one of advising and 
assisting the affected nation to improve its strategy (if it already has one) or 
to help it write one from scratch (if it does not). If the latter is the case, the 
U.S. should also strive to build up the strategy development capacity of the 
affected government.  
As previously discussed, the affected government may not be particularly 
eager to address some of the underlying causes of insurgency and so may 
5 Arnold and Wiener, Cold War, 121–23. 
6 Arnold and Wiener, Cold War, 123. 
7 Department of State, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, 
DC: Department of State, 2009), 35–48, www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt. 
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find U.S. suggestions unpalatable. If so, the U.S. will need to work with the 
affected government to encourage it to take the necessary steps.  
Once the affected nation has a viable COIN strategy, the U.S. should 
determine where American resources and actions can best be applied to 
contribute to the host nation’s goals.8 
Joint Publication 1-02 defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for 
employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to 
achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives,” which as evidenced above, the 
State Department’s guidance provides no universally accepted strategy.9 Instead, it 
instructs that the United States government relies on a host nation to develop a strategy for 
securing its country. One reason the United States government becomes involved in 
counterinsurgency campaigns, though, is due in part to the host nation’s inability to defend 
its population, borders, or interests without U.S. support. Ideally, the United States 
government should support other countries as they attempt to resolve internal conflicts, but 
it must be unwilling to inherit and adopt a poor strategy. Instead, the United States 
government should determine the quality of the current strategy and, if necessary, adjust 
an ineffective strategy to enable counterinsurgency efforts. More importantly, the United 
States government should have the tools necessary to create a counterinsurgency strategy 
should the host nation’s fail. 
The Department of Defense, in Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 
describes counterinsurgency strategy development as a joint process between the host 
nation and the United States government.10 It provides military planners flexibility in 
determining the amount of support the United States government provides to the host 
nation, given that country’s capabilities and the challenges it is addressing.11 Flexible 
8 Department of State, United States Counterinsurgency Guide, 44. 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 277, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/ 
misc/doctrine/CDG/ cdg_resources/manuals/jps/jp1_02.pdf. 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, JP 3-24 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 
III–16, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf. 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, III–4. 
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military strategy alone cannot achieve U.S. national objectives, according to the JP 3-24, 
because, “COIN requires a host nation political strategy that establishes, reinforces, and 
sustains the control, legitimacy, and effectiveness of its government while reducing that of 
the insurgency. The USG may exercise many forms of national power in support of the 
HN, which are often just as important to COIN as the JFC’s ability to apply lethal force.”12 
Military flexibility and subsequent success in counterinsurgency are dependent on the 
implementation of the other instruments of national power, which requires action by the 
Department of State.13 Reliance on the host nation for strategy development and 
implementation limits the chances to do so.  
Presently, the United States applies two widely accepted approaches toward 
counterinsurgency campaigns: the enemy-centric and the population-centric approach.14 
However, beyond broad ideas and concepts, both the Department of State and Department 
of Defense guidance provides limited details on strategy development and the sequence to 
apply the fundamentals of counterinsurgency. The continuing conflict in Afghanistan 
highlights doctrinal limitations, where the United States government is attempting to 
negotiate a political resolution with the Taliban to end America’s longest war, without 
really knowing the status of the conflict.15  
As the United States continues to support friendly nations facing security 
challenges, creating a shared understanding of how to develop a counterinsurgency strategy 
for the Department of State and Department of Defense planners can bridge theory and 
execution. It would positively impact the United States government’s ability to effectively 
engage in counterinsurgency efforts as needed, thereby achieving the desired political 
outcomes and attaining national objectives. What cannot become routine are conflicts 
similar to the one in Afghanistan, where the United States government’s proposed 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, I–4. 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency. III–5. 
14 Department of State, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide, 12. 
15 Vanda Fellab-Brown, “The US-Taliban Negotiations Breakthrough: What It Means and What Lies 
Ahead,” Brookings, January 29, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/29/the-
us-taliban-negotiations-breakthrough-what-it-means-and-what-lies-ahead. 
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withdrawal date is somewhere within the next three to five years, adding to an already 18-
year commitment.16 This study attempts to fill the gap in doctrine and counterinsurgency 
strategy by developing a universally viable way of executing a counterinsurgency 
campaign throughout its life cycle to prevent the United States government from finding 
itself in extended conflicts with no foreseeable end similar to Afghanistan now. 
Given the National Security Strategy’s shift of strategic priorities, the identification 
of the sequence gap in doctrine, and the United States’ continuation with the conflict in 
Afghanistan, the following research question is presented: “How should the key elements 
of a COIN campaign be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations 
to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national 
objectives?” The goal of this study is to develop a viable option of organizing an effective 
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy that explains not only the steps to take but the order to 
sequence each action. When applied, this option can ensure future U.S. counterinsurgency 
endeavors yield the desired results by providing decision-makers the pathway to establish 
the necessary conditions during each phase of a counterinsurgency campaign.  
B. THE PROCESS
The following six steps guide the study to answer the research question.
1. Identify a Viable Counterinsurgency Sequence
2. Determine Key Elements of Counterinsurgency
3. Create a Model to Understand Data
4. Analyze Data and Develop Hypotheses
5. Compare Data to Previous Research
6. Analyze Findings and Develop Recommendations
1. Identify a Viable Counterinsurgency Sequence
This study intends to show that victorious insurgencies have historically followed 
a generalizable pattern to achieve their desired objectives. The pattern emphasizes the 
interrelationship between the population, insurgent, and the counterinsurgent throughout a 
16 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Julian E. Barnes, “Under Peace Plan, U.S. Military Would Exit 
Afghanistan Within Five Years,” The New York Times, March 1, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/us/politics/afghanistan-military-withdrawal.html. 
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conflict’s life-cycle. As a foundation, the interrelationship of the three groups frames the 
sequence in which insurgencies follow through their life span. Understanding the pattern 
of an insurgency provides a blueprint that can be used to reverse engineer a 
counterinsurgency sequence. It is the most critical step of the process because not only 
does it serve as the foundation for all subsequent steps, but it explains why and when 
specific actions are necessary during the campaign. 
2. Determine Key Elements of Counterinsurgency
There are time-proven principles a counterinsurgent must satisfy to achieve desired 
objectives in a counterinsurgency campaign. These principles include factors that relate to 
pre-campaign conditions, civil and military operations, and post-campaign efforts to 
stabilize and retain the long-term goals of a counterinsurgency endeavor. Principles are 
drawn from leading research by academics on, and successful practitioners of 
counterinsurgency. The goal is to identify principles that provide direction and focus but 
do not limit the flexibility and creativity of decision-makers.  
3. Create a Model to Understand Data
This study’s methodological approach uses Professor Gordon McCormick’s 
Theoretical Diamond Model, and the 26 factors from Chris Paul’s Paths to Victory COIN 
scorecard to create a model to analyze counterinsurgency.17 McCormick’s Diamond 
Model provides a model that similarly follows the pattern determined in step one, while 
Paul’s 26 factors provide a list of counterinsurgency principles that satisfy the information 
gathered from step two. The two components, when overlaid, create a model to help 
interpret how elements of a counterinsurgency campaign should be sequenced. The two 
models approach counterinsurgency differently. McCormick’s Diamond Model relies on 
a theoretical, qualitative design of sequencing counterinsurgency into five phases, while 
Paul’s work reduces the complexities of 71 historical cases of counterinsurgency into 
17 Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 
11, 2018); Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2013). 
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26 quantifiable factors that, when scored, were perfectly correlated with the outcome of 
each conflict.18 By using both methods, the approach here uses qualitative and quantitative 
concepts to understand what, when, and why specific actions are critical in a 
counterinsurgency campaign. The literature gathered in steps one and two, on insurgent 
patterns and principles in counterinsurgency, respectively, guide the process between the 
two models. The approach inserts each of the 26 factors into one of the five phases of 
McCormick’s Model. If both McCormick’s Model and the 26 factors are valid, then a valid 
counterinsurgency sequence of key elements will be presented.  
4. Analyze Data and Develop Hypotheses
This step uses the on-going conflict in Afghanistan as a case study to test the 
efficacy of the model. The Afghan case study analyzes three national-level assessments 
conducted over five years to identify patterns of success, regression, and failure. The data 
for the study came from two sources. First, the study used data from the RAND 
Corporation, which conducted the first two national-level assessments in 2013 and 2015, 
respectively, scoring the conflict in Afghanistan using the 26 factors from Paths to 
Victory.19 The second set of data came from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, where 
students from the Defense Analysis Department, under the direction of Dr. Hy Rothstein, 
conducted applied research in support of the Commander, Special Operations Joint Task 
Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A).20 The applied research conducted a similar assessment, 
using open source data to conduct a national level assessment utilizing the Paths to Victory 
scorecard.21 When consolidated, the data provides a temporal display of counterinsurgency 
efforts in Afghanistan over a multi-year period, indicating areas where the United States, 
18 McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare”; Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 13. 
19 Christopher Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to 
Insurgencies Since World War II (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); Christopher Paul and 
Colin P. Clarke, Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016). 
20 Hy Rothstein and Michael Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan” 
(Applied Research for Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force [Afghanistan], November 27, 
2018). 
21 Paul et al., Paths to Victory; Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: 
Afghanistan.” 
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NATO allies, and the Afghan government have either successfully or unsuccessfully 
addressed critical factors relevant to counterinsurgency. Overlaying the five years of 
scoring with McCormick’s Theoretical Diamond Model explains why the output of the 
factors has resulted in the conditions that currently exist in Afghanistan. From this process, 
a series of hypotheses were developed, attempting to explain a way of sequencing the 
principles of a counterinsurgency campaign, while outlining the consequences by failing 
to follow this process.  
5. Compare Data to Previous Research
The most thorough and objective means of testing the hypotheses developed in the 
previous step is to compare the Afghan case study against other counterinsurgency cases. 
During its development, the authors of Paths to Victory evaluated and scored 205 phases 
of its 71 cases, where significant changes in the COIN forces effort to impact the conflict 
determined each phase.22 The method in step three using the Afghanistan case study 
replicates the temporal analysis available for the 71 cases from Paths to Victory. The 
similarity of data collection enables the study to compare the Afghan case study against 
the 71 cases objectively. Since Paths to Victory accurately predicted the outcome of each 
of the 71 cases using its COIN Scorecard, the patterns and trends derived from the 
comparison can objectively validate or invalidate each hypothesis.23 This study will 
evaluate one category of cases available in Paths Victory: the 28 External Actor-Support 
Case Studies.24 The 28 External Actor-Support Case Studies provide insight into situations 
most similar to what the United States may face in future conflicts. Additionally, it focuses 
on the key elements and campaign sequencing requisite for the United States to recommend 
and implement as the external supporter to host-nation counterinsurgency effort.  
These cases, by phase, will be inserted into the model developed in step three and 
compared accordingly to the Afghanistan case study. This comparison will test a series of 
hypotheses developed in step four. The point of the comparison is not to redo what the 
22 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 16. 
23 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 16.  
24 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 19–20, 74–78. 
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authors of Paths to Victory have already accomplished in understanding what factors 
determine the outcome of counterinsurgencies. Instead, the goal is to observe what patterns 
of sequences have occurred historically and to identify what sequencing yielded the best 
results. Ideally, a pattern will emerge from the analysis. The Afghan case study provides a 
current conflict to qualify these findings by highlighting the current counterinsurgency 
strategy discrepancies. The modeling will explain why this sequencing is critical, given its 
foundation in McCormick’s Theory of Victory. Then the cases will be compared to one 
another by phase. If the hypotheses are correct, the cases will show the cases progressed 
through their counterinsurgency campaigns similarly. If all conditions are satisfied, this 
study will determine how the elements of a COIN campaign should be sequenced from 
pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-
term attainment of national objectives. 
6. Analyze Findings and Develop Recommendations
The effort of the previous five steps is not an attempt to provide options for strategic 
and operational leaders to change or salvage U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Instead, this 
study seeks to provide senior leaders within the Department of State and the Department 
of Defense an understanding of options in sequencing elements of counterinsurgency from 
its inception to its completion for future application. Moreover, it will explain why these 
elements matter, and what the negative consequences of not correctly addressing each key 
element can do to undermine the counterinsurgency campaign. Understanding what, why, 
and when key elements should be sequenced ensures that the United States government 
establishes the necessary conditions before, during, and after a counterinsurgency 
campaign to ensure long term attainment of U.S. national objectives. These conditions, 
when satisfied, prevent the unnecessary losses now associated with the Afghanistan 
campaign. Furthermore, it provides decision-makers with the necessary understanding of 
counterinsurgency challenges to make informed decisions on potential engagement.  
C. SUMMARY
If great power competition is again the environment, then the United States
government can assume revisionist and rogue states will use all means to gain leverage 
10 
over the United States. If history indicates future events, then the United States government 
can expect these state actors to support insurgencies as a foreign policy tool. Given the gap 
in current U.S. guidance and doctrine for conducting counterinsurgency and the expected 
increase in insurgencies, the need for understanding how to sequence key elements of a 
counterinsurgency campaign is paramount to the security of the United States and its global 
partners. This study seeks to fill the gap in counterinsurgency sequencing by using the data 
from the war in Afghanistan to understand and refine the U.S. government’s approach to 
counterinsurgency, providing a viable way to ensure long-term attainment of national 
objectives from counterinsurgency efforts. Simultaneously, this study provides the U.S. 
government an understanding of how adversaries will capitalize on vulnerable countries to 
foster and support insurgencies to benefit their foreign policy objectives.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review summarizes concepts of counterinsurgency and 
determines there is a consensus amongst scholars on the actions a counterinsurgent force 
and government must take to achieve success in a counterinsurgency campaign. However, 
little evidence suggests a sequence exists as a one size fits all approach to order these 
principles. Most counterinsurgency practitioners and theorists tend to lean toward the same 
conclusion drawn by David Kilcullen that “counterinsurgency success depends on 
adaptability in the face of a rapidly evolving insurgent threat and a changing 
environment.”25 Since the enemy and environment constantly evolve, what is of greater 
importance is remaining ahead of the enemy, at least in terms of strategy implementation, 
instead of being tied to a proscribed strategy.  
Conceptually, Kilcullen’s approach mimics what strategist John Boyd championed 
with the development of the OODA Loop, where the decision-maker, who could observe, 
orient, decide, and act within their adversaries’ OODA Loop, gained a marked advantage 
in combat.26 The challenge with Boyd’s model, in the case of counterinsurgency, is the 
situation is not one of a pitched, aerial battle between fighter pilots locked in intense 
dogfighting, but an environment championed by the protracted nature of insurgent tactics. 
In that protraction, pitched battles can be rare and of little strategic value, serving only  
as a means to shape the political landscape in the desired area to gain an advantage  
over an opponent.  
There is value in Boyd’s model for decision-makers. Leaders at all levels would 
certainly benefit in a counterinsurgency campaign, should they be able to conduct their 
operations within the enemy’s OODA loop. However, sole reliance on Boyd’s concept can 
devolve into leaders making decisions using “off the cuff” or “figure it out as we go” 
mentalities. While certainly there are times when those approaches have yielded positive 
 
25 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20. 
26 Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London: 
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results, they rarely provide stability desired in a campaign. Using those approaches 
provides little reference to successors because knowledge resides with one individual, or 
there was no transferrable method to decision-making. New leadership is unaware of how 
the conflict has evolved, grown, and morphed during that time. Usually, it creates a 
scenario similar to the situation in Afghanistan where new units rotating into the country 
learn the same lessons and reestablish the same ground already gained by previous units. 
Often this is referred to as the United States fighting the same war in Afghanistan 18 
different times, or fighting 18 different one-year wars. 
Given the challenge presented by Kilcullen, this study’s theoretical framework 
seeks to determine a more objective way to view both key elements of a counterinsurgency 
campaign and their sequencing, without abandoning the principle of adaptability he 
championed.27 The goal is to fill the void that exists within a counterinsurgency strategy 
and provide an objective means of campaign sequencing to prevent the situation in 
Afghanistan from happening in the future. The sequence may not yield the desired 
objectives in every counterinsurgency campaign, but at a minimum, it prevents the United 
States from losing sight of where it is, and what its goals were at the outset of the campaign. 
Since there is no widely accepted approach for how counterinsurgency should be 
sequenced, this study builds its theoretical framework in three steps. The first is defining 
counterinsurgency to truly understand the demands these conflicts require not only the 
militaries fighting them but the governments supporting them. The second is developing a 
sequence that counterinsurgency can follow. Since there is no widely accepted pattern for 
counterinsurgency sequencing, this study creates a counterinsurgency sequence by using a 
successful insurgency blueprint to reverse engineer a sequence. The third step is to draw 
on historical examples from previously successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Building 
the theoretical framework in this way shapes the approach used in the following sections 
by insulating the approach with as much truth as possible.  
 
27 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 20. 
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A. DEFINING COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Both the Department of State’s United States Government Interagency 
Counterinsurgency Guide and the Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 3-24 
Counterinsurgency define counterinsurgency as “the blend of comprehensive civilian and 
military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its 
root causes.”28  In the JP 3-24, an insurgency is defined as “the organized use of subversion 
and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”29 When combined, 
counterinsurgency, as the United States defines it, is applying all the civil and military 
capability within the U.S. arsenal to prevent an insurgency from shifting the current 
political homeostasis of an area.  
Perhaps a more appropriate way to explain counterinsurgency is first to understand 
the type of war counterinsurgency manifests itself as, which is far more complicated than 
traditional war. Robert Trinquier, counterinsurgency theorist, and former French Army 
Colonel with experience in World War II, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War, and 
the Katanga Rebellion defines this as, “Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions—
political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established 
authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”30 Warfare is no longer 
fought between two armies on a distant battlefield, competing in tactics, materiel, and 
manpower, but a comprehensive blend of multiple disciplines, mostly non-military, to 
achieve desired objectives. Trinquier continues by saying, “To achieve this end, the 
aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, 
religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to 
be conquered.”31  
 
28 Department of State, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide, 2.; Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, xxiii.  
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, ix. 
30 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee 
(Westport: Praeger Security International, 1964), 6. 
31 Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 6. 
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Modern warfare is a complement of all actions taken by a militarily weaker 
adversary to exploit seams in the population to shift the political status of an affected area 
to achieve intended goals. Counterinsurgency is the reverse. Trinquier’s explanation 
explicitly describes the adversary in modern warfare and the focus of their energy, where 
present doctrine only describes the actions to take and the reasons for doing so. Trinquier 
explains how and why the adversary fights in this fashion that is different from a 
conventional military conflict. Embracing his explanation of modern warfare makes it 
possible to understand what counterinsurgency is designed to combat: the enemy’s ability 
to gain political control of contested space.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE INSURGENT PATTERN  
There has been a noticeable increase in the success of insurgencies in the last 
75 years, reinforcing why understanding insurgency is critical not only to the study, but 
also the United States government. Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in 
National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, in his book Invisible Armies: 
An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to Present explains the rate of 
insurgency success between 1775 and 1945 increased from 25.5 percent to 40.3 percent 
between 1945 and 2013.32 He believes the reason for the insurgent success stems from 
public opinion, specifically the ability to influence public opinion, enabling insurgencies 
to survive.33 In a post-World War II environment, the insurgent pattern is growing 
increasingly successful, and its success is more tied to the population than it was before, 
insofar as public opinion is more accessible to the insurgent now than in previous 
generations or centuries.  
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu writes, “What is of supreme importance in war is to 
attack the enemy’s strategy.”34 Using this principle as a guideline, understanding how an 
 
32 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to Present, 
1st ed. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 559. 
33 Max Boot, Invisible Armies, 559–60. 
34 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 77. 
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insurgency organizes itself to attack an enemy’s strategy produces a framework for 
sequencing the key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign. Even the Department of 
Defense manual, JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency, specifies that U.S. counterinsurgency efforts 
should attack an insurgent’s strategy.35  
Insurgent strategy, when reduced to its purest form, places effort in three areas:  
the conflicted population, the counterinsurgent, and the international community. 
Fundamentally, insurgencies engage these three population groups in sequence or attempt 
to address the three groups in order because of the evolution an insurgency follows. At 
their inception, insurgencies cannot match the military strength of the counterinsurgent 
force and must tailor their approach, following the identified pattern until the military 
disparity between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is reduced or nullified. Since 
insurgencies are militarily weaker than government forces, they must find ways to offset 
the disparity to render the military capability of the counterinsurgent irrelevant or 
ineffective. In On Guerrilla War, Mao Zedong provides insight into how an insurgency 
offsets this disparity in his three phases of protracted war: Phase I (organization, 
consolidation, and preservation), Phase II (progressive expansion), and Phase III (decision, 
or destruction of the enemy).36 Arguably, Mao’s teachings, initially published in 1937, 
became the standard framework used by many insurgencies around the world.  
The first phase of the insurgency requires an insurgent to gain and maintain support 
from the population.37 In his 1975 work, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, Andrew Mack articulates this point by determining a set of 
conditions the insurgency must achieve to create asymmetry, thereby enabling the 
insurgent to win.38 Specifically, the weaker opponents defeat the militarily powerful when 
the insurgent refuses to confront the more powerful enemy on his terms and receives 
 
35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, II–4.  
36 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign: University of Illinois 
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37 Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 22. 
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support from the population.39 Sustainable popular support both preserves an insurgency 
and creates the asymmetry needed to counter the state. 
The relationship between the insurgent and the population suggests the population 
is the center of gravity in an insurgency. The JP 5-0 Joint Planning manual defines a center 
of gravity as “a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 
action, or will to act.”40 More narrowly defined, the population’s political will to support 
the conflict is the center of gravity in an insurgency. While the JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
manual explains the population is not always the center of gravity, it does say, “the 
population will typically become a primary factor in the success or failure of the 
insurgency.”41 The counterinsurgent must not look beyond the population during a 
counterinsurgency campaign. The population’s political will provides the ends, ways, and 
means of insurgent strategy. In his work Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the 
Army War College Strategy Model, H. Richard Yarger describes ends, ways, means as “the 
ends are ‘objectives,’ the ways are the ‘concepts’ for accomplishing the objectives, and the 
means are the ‘resources’ for supporting the concepts.”42 Therefore, control of the ability 
to influence or manipulate political will is requisite in an insurgency. Without popular 
support that allows an insurgent to shift political will, the insurgent cannot create the 
asymmetry Mack is describing in his work.43  
Phase two of the insurgency seeks to create a set of conditions isolating the 
counterinsurgent from the population. The population consists of two primary groups: the 
counterinsurgent’s home population, and the population in the conflict space. Mack uses 
the French involvement in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 to describe the shift in political 
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sentiment of the French population as evidence of the impact of isolating the 
counterinsurgent.44 Isolating the French government from its population reduced the 
French resolve to counter Algerian resistance. As insurgencies and by extension, 
counterinsurgencies continue to fight for control of political space, a break down in 
political support across the two groups isolates the counterinsurgent. Mack refers to this 
occurring due to the difference in commitment level between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent.45 Gil Merom, in The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in 
Algeria, describes the unfavorable shift in French political opinion for the war in Algeria 
throughout the 1950s as a leading cause for the failure of French foreign policy 
objectives.46 Achieving military success paid few dividends because of the shift in French 
social consciousness to no longer supporting the war effort made tactical or operational 
military successes irrelevant.47 The United States saw the same decline in support during 
the Vietnam War.48 As the civil-military divide widens, the effectiveness of the 
counterinsurgency force declines. The insurgent contributes to the isolation of the 
counterinsurgent by creating a disparity in commitment level, and elevating the costs of 
the conflict to more than a nation’s population is willing to bear.49  
Throughout the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must prevent the insurgent from 
isolating the counterinsurgent from the population. In the introduction to Roger Trinquier’s 
Modern Warfare, Bernard Fall writes,  
In revolutionary war…the allegiance of the civilian population becomes one 
of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle. This is indeed the key 
message that Trinquier seeks to impress upon his reader: Military tactics 
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and hardware are all well and good, but they are really quite useless if one 
has lost the confidence of the population among whom one is fighting.50  
The schism between the population and counterinsurgent occurs because the 
counterinsurgent seeks decisive military action, while insurgents aim to manipulate the 
population into action.51 As a result, the population becomes the target of decisive military 
action by the counterinsurgent, isolating the counterinsurgent from the population.  
The third phase of the insurgency requires the insurgent to seek legitimacy with the 
international community and acquire external support. They execute this much in the same 
way the host-nation seeks legitimacy and foreign assistance. Continuing in the pattern of 
an insurgency, Jeffrey Record, in Why the Strong Lose, asserts that if an insurgency 
maintains the stronger will and superior insurgent strategy over its opponent, and receives 
external assistance, the insurgency will succeed in defeating a democracy.52 States, 
particularly in the Cold War, routinely provided support to insurgencies to further their 
national objectives around the world.53 This trend has continued since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. In their book, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 
Daniel Byman et al. write, “out of the 74 post—Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state 
support, we believe, played a major role in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or 
otherwise assisting 44 of them.”54 In seeking assistance, the insurgent now competes with 
the current government as an equal, effectively challenging, and potentially negating the 
government’s political control of the population. 
Given the insurgent pattern and the keys that make an insurgency successful, the 
counterinsurgent pattern should not react to an insurgent strategy. Instead, it should 
proactively target the population to create an asymmetry between the counterinsurgent and 
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the insurgent. Counterinsurgency should undermine the insurgent’s strategy following 
three tenets: achieve the support of the local population, isolate the insurgent from the 
population, and retain international legitimacy and support. In application, the 
counterinsurgency sequence deliberately places the insurgent in the periphery, ensuring to 
focus the bulk of its energy and effort on the population conflicted population. Since the 
insurgency begins militarily disadvantaged, the approach remains strategically acceptable, 
providing time and space for other relevant instruments of national power to be leveraged 
and take root. This sequence perhaps best accomplishes what David Galula expresses about 
asymmetry in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, when he writes, “There 
is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary war. This phenomenon 
results from the very nature of war, from the disproportion of strength between the 
opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and their 
liabilities.”55 The counterinsurgent sequence outlined here nullifies the insurgents’ ability 
to create and maintain the necessary asymmetry because doing so would force the 
insurgents to resort to terrorism, isolating them further from the population.56  
C. KEY ELEMENTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Given the sequence identified by reviewing and understanding insurgency, the next 
step is determining what elements of counterinsurgency to overlay in the pattern. While 
there are numerous examples of successful counterinsurgency practices, this section seeks 
to identify the broadest applicable principles of counterinsurgency practice. The broader 
the action, the more applicable they are to counterinsurgency practitioners because they 
allow for the maximum flexibility needed in the complex environment Kilcullen describes 
in Counterinsurgency.”57 Reasonably, though, given the protracted and decentralized 
nature of these conflicts and how many decision-makers will be required to make quick 
decisions, there must be something that unifies and preserves their vision and focus. Robert 
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R. Reilly, a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, in No Substitute for 
Substance, writes, “The job of U.S. public diplomacy, then, should be to advance the justice 
of our cause—our “principles and values”—while simultaneously undermining our 
opponent’s claim to the same.  Any activity that is not engaged in doing at least one of 
these two things is not public diplomacy.”58 He is discussing the importance of two critical 
components of U.S. public diplomacy: the unity of purpose and narrative. When applied to 
counterinsurgency, which is a Department of State-led initiative, and thereby a diplomatic 
effort, unity of purpose enables flexibility and agility in a campaign while synchronizing 
that effort to the overarching narrative of justice and virtue. Unity of purpose from the U.S. 
government’s highest leaders down to the individual diplomat or military officer is 
requisite to success in a counterinsurgency campaign. Logically, the same principle applies 
to the host nation’s justice and values whom the United States supports. Unity of purpose, 
ensures all parties involved remain focused on the desired objectives the United States 
seeks to achieve by engaging in a counterinsurgency campaign. A consistent narrative 
executed in this fashion targets and messages the conflicted population and the 
international community, promoting the justice of the United States and host nation’s cause 
while preserving the counterinsurgency campaign’s legitimacy.  
There must be a viable means of communicating with the population in order to 
convey a narrative. In Explosive Connections? Mass media, social media, and geography 
of collective violence in African states, Professor T. Camber Warren finds substantial 
evidence between media influence and levels of collective violence in 24 African 
countries.59 He analyzed two forms of communication, centralized radio and cell phone 
access, and the impact of geography on the states’ ability to convey information to the 
population.60 Within the analysis, states, through vertical mass communication by way of 
 
58 Robert R. Reilly, “No Substitute for Substance,” The Journal of International Security Affairs 0, no. 
17 (Fall 2009): 10, http://www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.nps.edu/journal_issues/660. 
59 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 297–311. 
60 Warren. “Explosive Connections,” 297. 
 
21 
radio, can reduce levels of collective violence through messages of unification and peace.61 
The findings demonstrate the necessity of strategic communication and messaging from 
the state to the population. Doing so reinforces the unity of purpose the state is attempting 
to achieve while promoting the narrative of the counterinsurgent force.  
When the United States government commits to a counterinsurgency, choosing the 
appropriate composition of diplomatic and military personnel matters. Traditional military 
campaigns tend to use a top-down, authoritarian approach, but according to Andrew J. 
Gawthorpe, in All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy, 
degrading the legitimacy of an insurgency is very challenging and most often impossible 
from a top-down approach.62 If all insurgency is local, then the need to sever the 
relationship at the local level is a must for the counterinsurgent. Therefore, the type of 
counterinsurgent employed must be capable of addressing problems at the local level to 
reduce rebel legitimacy. According to Doctor Kalev Sepp, who at the time had recently 
returned from the staff of Multinational Forces-Iraq, in Best Practices in 
Counterinsurgency, coined, “In the U.S. Armed Forces, only the Special Forces (SF) are 
expressly organized and trained for counterinsurgent warfare and advising indigenous 
forces.”63 When employed, U.S. Army SF allows diplomatic and military planners to 
engage at local levels to reduce rebel legitimacy without establishing an authoritarian top-
down approach that undermines the counterinsurgency effort. Special Forces units need 
only a small footprint, and their employment prevents the U.S. military from 
overcommitting conventional troops while forcing the host-nation to take a leading role. 
Special Forces also retains the ability to train, advise, and build the capacity of partner 
forces to combat threats. Since SF can work aptly through and with partner forces, a 
byproduct of their relationship is a grasp of the environment at the local level. 
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Understanding the environment is a stepping stone for intelligence collection and 
control of the narrative. According to Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John 
Nagl, in Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, precise knowledge 
of the environment is requisite for the intelligence collection and application processes.64 
There is an inherent challenge of discriminating between the enemy and civilians in an 
insurgency because the nature of the conflict is different from other forms of warfare.65 
Any action without thoroughly vetted intelligence may result in the misidentification of the 
enemy or be carried out against civilians, who are equally the focus of the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent. Mistakes in intelligence undermine the counterinsurgent’s effort. Precise 
use of intelligence allows the counterinsurgent to shape operations that serve multiple 
purposes. Intelligence allows the counterinsurgent to control the narrative and own the 
initiative against the insurgent. Intelligence-based operations equally safeguard the 
population from threats while demonstrating the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent force.  
Intelligence-based operations, and more broadly intelligence collection, suffer one 
significant limitation. Many insurgencies benefit from external support and sanctuary, 
much in the same way the United States supports host nations in counterinsurgency efforts. 
While intelligence collection can identify external support, there may be little the military 
action arm of the counterinsurgency can do to address the problem. In Explaining External 
Support for Insurgent Groups, Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David 
Cunningham attempted to understand the relationship between rebel groups and their 
external supporters.66 Their findings indicate that insurgencies are more likely to receive 
external support if the state receives external support.67 Meaning that the United States 
should expect another country, potentially a revisionist or rogue state, to provide external 
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support to insurgencies solely because the United States is aiding the host nation. 
Opportunistic statecraft against U.S. efforts in counterinsurgency must be addressed at the 
tactical and strategic level to ensure what Trinquier describes as a “durable peace.”68 
Moreover, isolating the insurgent and reducing external support limits the complexities of 
an already complex environment.  
Within the framework of key elements of counterinsurgency, this section identifies 
dynamic leadership, unity of purpose, narrative, strategic communication, well-suited 
forces, intelligence, and reducing external support as the key elements that enable a 
counterinsurgency campaign to succeed. That is not to say these are the only principles of 
counterinsurgency, but their broad nature satisfies two critical components: their 
acceptability and applicability to most counterinsurgencies and they do not limit, but enable 
individuals to make decisions and take action. Furthermore, based on the evidence, all of 
these principles must be present in successful counterinsurgency. When overlaid with the 
counterinsurgent pattern that focuses on gaining support from the population, isolating the 
insurgent, and retaining legitimacy from the international community, the key elements 
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This chapter explains the genesis of the model used in the remainder of the study.
The information is sequenced chronologically, covering a period from July 2018 to 
December 2018. In doing so, it shows that the final product spawned from an operational 
requirement from a forward Special Operations command, SOJTF-A. The commander and 
his staff provided guidance and direction to set this effort in motion. Furthermore, this 
section highlights the efforts of nearly two dozen students and faculty, who provided input 
and criticism during the model’s development, to provide the most objective and complete 
product back to the command and operational force. Outlining the process undertaken 
satisfies two things: first, it documents the efforts of all the personnel who participated and 
contributed in the combined effort, and second, it shows where the model started, where it 
changed, and how it evolved into its current form. Additionally, the approach uses data 
collected from the previous applied research, and the process identifies how and where that 
data was collected. 
B. BACKGROUND
As previously described in the introduction, this study’s methodological approach
uses Professor Gordon McCormick’s Theoretical Diamond Model, and the 26 factors from 
Paths to Victory to create a model to analyze counterinsurgency.69 However, the model 
itself grew and evolved over six months of applied research from July to December 2018. 
Initially, students from the Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, developed an assessment tool, built from McCormick’s Theoretical 
Diamond Model and the COIN Scorecard from Paths to Victory, as applied research on 
behalf of the Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), in August 
2018. The students, comprised of Department of Navy and U.S. Army officers and non-
commissioned officers under the direction of Dr. Hy Rothstein, senior lecturer, and Colonel 
69 Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”; Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 249. 
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Michael Richardson, U.S. Army, Chair for Special Operations Forces, developed the tool 
to support command directed priorities from the SOJTF-A Commander in Afghanistan.  
The tool sought to assess conditions nationally and sub-nationally in Afghanistan 
to identify areas with suitable conditions for the United States to begin negotiations for a 
peaceful settlement with the Taliban. Development supported the commander’s priority of 
achieving peaceful reconciliation with the Taliban through a negotiated settlement. 
Furthermore, the tool attempted to identify not only where the conditions were suitable for 
negotiations, but why those conditions were satisfactory. The idea would be to replicate 
successful conditions throughout Afghanistan and achieve peace, one district, province, or 
region at a time. Conversely, a thorough understanding of ideal or suitable conditions at 
the tactical and operational levels within Afghanistan would prevent U.S. and NATO 
forces from entering into negotiations with the Taliban when the tool determined the 
conditions were not favorable to the United States. The goal was to prevent U.S. forces 
from making unacceptable concessions to the Taliban to achieve peace. The applied 
research team hypothesized that, when executed, the assessment tool of Professor 
McCormick’s Model, with the Paths to Victory’s 26 factors provided an accurate, 
measurable assessment tool to determine the conditions in an area before entering into a 
negotiation. If conditions are not suitable to enter a negotiation, the tool identified where 
within the McCormick Model counterinsurgency efforts were failing. 
C. GORDON MCCORMICK’S THEORETICAL DIAMOND MODEL 
Professor Gordon McCormick’s Theoretical Diamond Model is a linear approach 
for a state to successfully defeat an insurgent force by gaining political control of the 
population.70 It breaks up the activities of counterinsurgency into five phases: Secure the 
Population, Separate Insurgents from the Population, Target Insurgents, Disconnect 
Insurgents from External Support, Target External Support.71 According to McCormick’s 
theory, actions taken by the counterinsurgent must be executed in succession, beginning 
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with securing the population and ending with targeting external support to defeat an 
insurgent force.72 Therefore, any effort to address the other four phases before addressing 
the first is wasted energy and will not achieve the desired outcomes.73 When evaluating 
the outcomes of counterinsurgency campaigns, this model explains why the activity 
conducted by the COIN force succeeded or failed. Success in the previous phase is the only 
way to achieve success in the subsequent phase adequately. Figure 1 is a depiction of how 
the COIN force and the insurgent forces are competing against one another to gain political 
control of the population.  
Gordon McCormick’s Theoretical Diamond Model.74 
72 McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
73 McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
74 Source: McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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D. CHRISTOPHER PAUL’S PATHS TO VICTORY SCORECARD
In their work, Paths to Victory, Christopher Paul et al. conducted case studies of 71
insurgencies from 1944 to 2010.75 Through analysis, expanding on the original work, 
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, the authors 
reviewed the multiple variables affecting each insurgency.76 During this process, they 
effectively reduced the complexities found in every insurgency down to 26 relevant 
factors.77 They further reduced these factors to 15 positive factors and 11 negative factors, 
defining the positive factors as good COIN practices, and the 11 negative factors as bad 
COIN practices.78 When applied, as the Settlement Scorecard, the 26 factors successfully 
determine, for all 71 cases, the winners/losers of each conflict, and which conflicts end in 
a negotiated settlement.79 The factors then, broadly represent the relevant principles that a 
COIN force must address during the life-cycle of a counterinsurgency campaign. Figure 2, 
Scorecard from Paths to Victory, shows the original scorecard used by Doctor Paul and his 
colleagues to score the 71 cases.    
75 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 13. 
76 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of 
Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010). 
77 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 141–142. 
78 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 141–142. 








 Scorecard from Paths to Victory.80 
 
80 Source: Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–272.  
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E. PATHS TO VICTORY SCORECARD EXPLAINED 
The scorecard provides a simple and effective means to score a conflict. Scoring 
occurs on a binary scale. In terms of the 26 factors, if a factor is present within the assessed 
area, it scores a 1; if absent, a 0.81 Naturally, the pervasive presence of several factors may 
be controversial, and assessors will not agree. If there is significant disagreement in expert 
analysis of the data, the assessors score the factor as 0.5.82 The cumulative negative points 
are then subtracted from the cumulative positive points to get the final score for the 
insurgency. Given the number of positive and negative factors, scores can range from  
+15 to -11. For context, the average score for a COIN force to win is +8, and the average 
score for an insurgent win is -4.5; the lowest score for a COIN force win is +2, and the 
highest score for an insurgent win is -1.83 Additionally, the length of time a COIN force 
maintains certain factors contributes to the durability of the COIN force win.84 
F. INITIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR SOJTF-A 
The McCormick Model and the COIN Scorecard were then overlaid together to 
form the assessment tool, as seen in Figure 3. The applied research team placed each of the 
26 factors into where they thought they fit into McCormick’s Diamond Model. In doing 
so, the tool indicates that many of the factors occur in multiple phases of McCormick’s 
Model, presenting the challenges associated with counterinsurgency efforts and 
sequencing. Each factor’s location within the assessment tool was discussed, but the 
majority of the effort centered on the assessment of the conflict in Afghanistan, rather than 
focusing on the location of each of the 26 factors.  
 
81 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 194 
82 Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since 
World War II, 6. 
83 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 142. 
84 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 164–165 
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 Initial Assessment Tool for SOJTF-A85 
G. PROOF OF CONCEPT OF THE ASSESSMENT TOOL  
Since the applied research supported command requirements, the majority of effort 
centered on gathering information to score Afghanistan at the national level using the 
COIN Scorecard as a proof of concept to demonstrate the efficacy of the assessment tool. 
Students relied on different information for assessment than what the RAND Corporation 
used for its national scoring for Afghanistan in 2013 and 2015.86  The students researched 
and collected data from multiple sources, including the Asia Study Foundation, Brookings 
 
85 Adapted from: Hy Rothstein and Michael Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: 
Afghanistan” (Applied Research for Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force [Afghanistan], 
November 27, 2018); Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
86 Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since 
World War II, 6–8; Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 29–31. 
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Institute, SIGARs, and RAND. There were gaps in the literature when attempting to score 
the 26 factors because many of the previously established systems used to collect the data 
in Afghanistan no longer existed for the type of data required. For these gaps, the students 
attempted to use available quantitative data. When the quantitative data was unavailable, 
students used qualitative data based on knowledge, multiple years of combat experience in 
the country, and academic understanding of the current situation in Afghanistan. The 
students researched in 2018, using the 2017 Afghanistan data.  
Upon collection and synthesis of the data, the students conducting the applied 
research scored the condition of Afghanistan in 2017 at the national level using the same 
methodology as the Paths to Victory settlement scorecard. The National Level Assessment 
produced an overall score of -0.5, which given the previous explanation of the settlement 
scorecard, the Taliban, and not the COIN force is winning.87 Furthermore, with a negative 
score, if the United States were to enter into a national level negotiation with the Taliban, 
it would be expected the United States would have to make significant concessions to 
achieve a settlement.  
This analysis, when briefed to the Commander, SOJTF-A recommended that to 
achieve peaceful resolution and settlement at the national level, the United States must be 
willing to make concessions to the Taliban, given the score. Further, the research team 
believed that when compared to the state of the conflict at the time of the brief, the 
assessment tool proved its efficacy and validity as a means of assessing conditions in 
Afghanistan using unclassified, open-source data. Figure 4 identifies how Afghanistan at 
the national level, using 2017 data, was scored against the 26 factors from Paths to Victory.  
 




 2018 NPS National Level Assessment (Afghanistan)88 
H. REFINING THE ASSESSMENT TOOL INTO ITS PRESENT FORM 
Upon completion of the initial scoring using the assessment tool, the NPS team 
identified a limitation. Where each of the factors, with their score, fell into McCormick’s 
Model was not apparent to the audience, given the initial overlay provided in Figure 3. 
Practically speaking, the time available forced the applied research team to spend a 
majority of its energy scoring the conflict in Afghanistan at the national level to provide an 
assessment and recommendation to the Commander, SOJTF-A. To remedy this, the 
students devoted significant time during the latter portion of the six-month development 
 
88 Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan.”; 
Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72. 
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process to determine the most objective and complete way to determine where the 26 
factors fit into McCormick’s Model. 
During this period of refinement, the research team grounded its approach in the 
fundamental argument made by Professor McCormick. He argues that a counterinsurgent 
force must execute each of the five phases in sequence, and to successfully proceed through 
the five phases, conditions in previous phases must be wholly satisfied.89 That is to say, in 
order to successfully target insurgents, a COIN force must completely secure the 
population and separate the population from the insurgents. Holding to McCormick’s 
Theory, the team determined that the most appropriate way to place the 26 factors was to 
use the premise as the baseline condition. Therefore, the team evaluated and placed each 
of the 26 factors where they are most logically to begin.90 That way, the location and 
sequence of the factors hold the premise made by Professor McCormick. The literature 
review on insurgent patterns and principles serves as an azimuth check on where each of 
the 26 factors of the COIN scorecard fell into McCormick’s model. The output of this 
process created a new model that more prominently fills the gap and reduces the limitation 
of the assessment tool. In its new form, the hybrid model provides a first glance at 
understanding how the key elements of a COIN campaign should be sequenced from pre-
campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term 
attainment of national objectives. Figure 5 shows the new model. 
 
89 McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
90 Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan.” 
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 Hybrid Model91 
I. WHAT THE NEW MODEL SAYS 
In its genesis, the new model creates an outline of an answer to the research 
question: How should the key elements of a COIN campaign be sequenced from pre-
campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term 
attainment of national objectives? Since the method from Paths to Victory accurately 
classified the outcomes of the cases it evaluated, it is logical to assume that affecting the 
26 factors in the order presented against McCormick’s Model will yield similar results, as 
 
91 Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan”; 
Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
McCormick's Model           
(Annotated by Phase)
Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors 
2 1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors
4 2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors
1 3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict
3 5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 
3 7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained 
3 8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force,  or other illegitimate applications of forc
1 9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict
2
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict 
controlled or claimed by COIN force
1 11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces
1 12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas
2 13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseli  
2 14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control
1 15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control
3 1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression 
1 2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule
1 3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict
4 4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents
5 5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters 
3 6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents
3 7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics 
1 8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents 
2 9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated 
1 10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment





they relate to long-term attainment of United States national objectives in future cases. By 
inserting the data from the previous model into the new one, the students conducting the 
applied research could better interpret the reasons why the current campaign in Afghanistan 
was yielding the observed results. Figure 6 depicts the information researched on behalf of 
the SOJTF-A Command, and presents it in a new model to more thoroughly and objectively 
provide answers to the operational requirements.  
 
 Hybrid Model with 2018 NPS National Level Assessment92 
 
92 Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan”; 
Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
McCormick's Model           
(Annotated by Phase)
Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors 
YEAR (2018) 
2 1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors 0
4 2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors 0
1 3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor 0.5
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict 0
3 5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor 1
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 1
3 7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained 0
3
8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force,  or other illegitimate applications of 
force 0.5
1 9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict 0
2
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict 
controlled or claimed by COIN force 0.5
1 11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces 0.5
1 12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas 0
2
13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical 
baseline 0
2 14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control 0
1 15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control 0
3 1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression 0.5
1 2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule 1
1 3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict 1
4 4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents 0
5 5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters 1
3 6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents 1
3 7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics 0
1 8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents 0
2 9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated 0
1 10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment 0
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J. HOW TO TEST IF THE SEQUENCE IS VALID 
While both McCormick’s Model and the COIN Scorecard may be valid, their 
validity does not prove the new model’s validity. The new model, at present, provides no 
way to prove new data points it presents. These data points include that over 60% of all 
COIN activity (16/26 factors) occurs before ever prioritizing targeting insurgents, the third 
step of McCormick’s Model. Next, over 90% of the factors (24/26) occur in the first three 
phases, meaning that the two remaining factors should be of relatively little importance. 
While these are interesting data points, the primary purpose of this study is to use the model 
to evaluate previously collected case data, develop hypotheses, and test those hypotheses 
against the field. Accomplishing all 26 factors from Paths to Victory will certainly yield 
COIN success. What is critical is using this concept to determine what key elements a 
COIN force should prioritize during a campaign. The most objective way to test the 
model’s validity is to take an otherwise vertical model and expand it temporally. The 
temporal analysis shows how conflicts change throughout their life cycle. If during their 
life cycle, specific factors significantly impact the conflict, the temporal analysis should 
identify them. Replicating this test across multiple insurgencies may provide evidence to 
support the claim that a counterinsurgency campaign can be objectively sequenced, 
regardless of the conflict. 
K. EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS TEMPORALLY  
During the assessment phase of each conflict in Paths to Victory, Paul et al. scored 
each conflict at what they determined to be the decisive phase for each of the 71 cases.93 
The 2018 National Level Assessment in Figure 6. is scored the same way. By  
comparing the score from 2018 to previous scores from 2013 and 2015 Afghanistan, 
provided  by the RAND Corporation, the data creates a temporal display of the conflict 
over five years (2013–2017).94 The approach analyzes the conflict in Afghanistan over 
five years to develop a series of hypotheses about the sequencing of key elements of a 
 
93 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxv. 
94 Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since 
World War II, 6–8; Paul and Clarke, Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update, 29–31. 
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counterinsurgency campaign to test against the field of the cases. Replicating this same 
process by inserting all the phase case data (204 phases from 71 insurgencies) from Paths 
to Victory, into the new model provides a means of comparing an ongoing conflict against 
previous conflicts, whose scores are accurate, validating or invalidating the subsequent 
hypotheses. Below in Figure 7, the new model displays the data for Afghanistan 
temporally, serving as the foundation for this study’s method. Specifically, it shows the 
national level scores for each of the 26 factors with a combined score at the bottom.  
 
  New Model with Afghanistan Temporal Data.95 
 
95 Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan”; 
Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World 
War II, 6–8; Paul and Clarke, Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update, 29–31. 
McCormick's Model           
(Annotated by Phase)
Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors 
2013 2015 2018
2 1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors 0 0 0
4 2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors 0 0 0
1 3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor 0 1 0.5
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict 0 0 0
3 5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor 1 1 1
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 1 1 1
3 7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained 0 0.5 0
3
8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force,  or other illegitimate 
applications of force 1 0.5 0.5
1 9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict 1 1 0
2
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force 1 1 0.5
1 11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces 1 0.5 0.5
1 12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas 0.5 0 0
2
13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above 
historical baseline 0.5 1 0
2 14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control 0.5 0 0
1 15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control 0.5 0 0
3 1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression 0 0 0.5
1 2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule 1 1 1
1 3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict 1 1 1
4 4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents 0 0 0
5 5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters 1 1 1
3 6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents 1 1 1
3 7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics 0 0 0
1 8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents 0 0 0
2 9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated 0.5 0.5 0
1 10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment 0.5 0 0
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IV. ANALYZE DATA AND DEVELOP HYPOTHESES 
A. OVERVIEW 
A researcher unfamiliar with either McCormick’s Theoretical Diamond Model or 
with the COIN Scorecard from Paths to Victory might find the model complex given the 
five columns and 27 rows of information, including the overall national scores. The three 
national-level scores from Afghanistan have undergone a simple layer of analysis to 
simplify the model, and are color-coded to identify the pattern the analysis reveals. The 
analysis is categorized into three categories (green, blue, and red). Rows colored green 
indicate that the COIN force positively impacted the factor over the time or phases. Rows 
colored blue indicate that the COIN force has regressed in its’ effectiveness over the 
phases. Rows colored red indicate that the COIN force has either neglected the factor or 
been unable to effect it all together. Color coding succeeds in simplifying the model and 
highlights factors to show the COIN force’s performance, however positive or negative, in 
each factor. The association with several steps within McCormick’s Model generally 
illustrates where that action should have occurred. With McCormick’s Model as a starting 
point, it is then possible to simultaneously analyze the performance of the COIN force 
against a sequence to develop hypotheses to address the research question of this study. 
Once developed, the hypotheses can be tested against the 71 other cases from Paths to 
Victory, thereby validating or invalidating the hypothesis. This chapter develops four 
hypotheses for COIN campaign sequencing to test against 28 cases from Paths to Victory 









96 Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan” 
Christopher Paul et al., Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies 
Since World War II, 6–8; Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update, 29–
31; Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”  
McCormick's Model           
(Annotated by Phase)
Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors 
2013 2015 2018
2 1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors 0 0 0
4 2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors 0 0 0
1 3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor 0 1 0.5
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict 0 0 0
3 5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor 1 1 1
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 1 1 1
3 7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained 0 0.5 0
3
8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force,  or other illegitimate 
applications of force 1 0.5 0.5
1 9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict 1 1 0
2
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area 
of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force 1 1 0.5
1 11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces 1 0.5 0.5
1 12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas 0.5 0 0
2
13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially 
above historical baseline 0.5 1 0
2 14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control 0.5 0 0
1
15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to 
control 0.5 0 0
3 1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression 0 0 0.5
1 2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule 1 1 1
1 3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict 1 1 1
4 4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents 0 0 0
5 5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters 1 1 1
3 6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents 1 1 1
3 7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics 0 0 0
1 8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents 0 0 0
2
9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better 
motivated 0.5 0.5 0
1 10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment 0.5 0 0
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B. OBSERVATIONS DRAWN FROM ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL  
Observation 1. The COIN force has been effective in defeating insurgent forces in 
direct military engagement, even with the reduction in troops from the NATO 
mission since 2014.  
Observation 2. Three of the four Bad COIN practices neglected by the COIN force 
have no association with tactical offensive military activity. 
Observation 3. Seventy-Five Percent (12/16) factors falling in the first two steps 
of McCormick’s Diamond Model have either been neglected or regressed. 
Observation 4. No quantifiable diplomatic or economic progress has been made at 
the national level, given the inability for GIRoA to exercise governance at the 
national level. 
Observation 5. At no point in time has the COIN force adequately achieved any 
form of strategic communication to reach the entire population of the country.  
Observation 6. Unity of Command and Effort and Levels of Commitment by the 











C. HYPOTHESES  
Hypotheses 1: Given observations one through four, COIN campaigns that 
prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts 
over military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over 
COIN campaigns that do not.  
Hypothesis 2: Given observation five, COIN campaigns that realize strategic 
communication factors early in the campaigns achieve their desired objectives over 
COIN campaigns that do not.  
Hypothesis 3: Given observations one and three, tactical military superiority 
against an insurgent force, while required throughout the conflict, does not translate 
to success in a COIN campaign.  
Hypothesis 4: Given observations five and six, a shared vision and unity of purpose 
early in a COIN campaign to enables a campaign to be successful over those that 








V. COMPARE DATA TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section compares the Afghanistan Case Study to the 28 Cases of External 
Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies from Paths to Victory, intending to validate or 
invalidate each of the four hypotheses developed during the previous chapter.97 By 
assigning factors from the COIN Scorecard in Paths to Victory to each of the four 
hypotheses, this section calculates the success and failure rates of the factors evaluated 
from the cases. The success and failure rates for each of these hypotheses will determine 
whether or not the factors are indeed key in external actor supported conflicts. Further, 
when evaluated against the phase data, this study argues that the successful COIN conflicts 
will reveal that counterinsurgency campaigns realized the factors in the order supported by 
each factor’s assignment to one of the five phases of McCormick’s Model. Therefore, those 
factors assigned to the first phase of McCormick’s Model occurred earlier than those 
assigned to the later phases in COIN wins. Determining this will be done by observing, in 
COIN wins, the order each factor occurred. Ideally, each factor will occur in the same phase 
for each conflict, thereby proving that key elements must occur in a particular order to yield 
the desired results. If accurate, this study would provide evidence supporting an objective 
way for the United States to sequence future counterinsurgency efforts.  
B. INSERTING THE CASES INTO THE MODEL 
To effectively compare the data by category, this study inserts the identified cases 
with their phase data into the model developed in Chapter III.98 The same level of analysis 
using the color-coded system is applied to each case to support the comparison for both the 
key elements and the sequencing portions against the Afghanistan data. They are in the 
 
97 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 77–78. 
98 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 204–6. 
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Appendix: 28 Cases of External Actor-Support Counterinsurgencies.99 These serve as a 
reference when interpreting the data that comes out in this chapter.  
C. ASSIGNING FACTORS TO HYPOTHESES 
Determining which factors from the COIN Scorecard to assign to each hypothesis 
is the first step in the validation/invalidation process. Factors are assigned to each 
hypothesis based on the direct impact they would have on the hypothesis itself. In some 
cases, only one factor is assigned to a hypothesis; in others, multiple factors are assigned 
based upon the broader scope of the hypothesis. Two of the hypotheses have multiple 
combinations of factors assigned to them, given the possibility that many factors within the 
COIN scorecard could equally impact the hypotheses. Every factor that supports a 
hypothesis is drawn from the analysis conducted on the conflict in Afghanistan, thus using 
the ongoing conflict as a litmus to test counterinsurgency principles and sequencing against 
the historical cases. Figure 9: Hypotheses and Assigned Factors, shows how the factors 
from the COIN Scorecard have been assigned to each of the hypotheses. McCormick’s 
Model indicates when in a counterinsurgency campaign, the hypothesis is most relevant. 
To explain, Combination A shows that three factors (4,10,14), when simultaneously 
achieved early in a COIN campaign address Hypothesis 1, which stated, COIN campaigns 
that prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts 
over military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over COIN 
campaigns that do not. Every subsequent combination can be read the same way. The 
purpose of Figure 9 is to organize the hypotheses and the components of the hybrid model 
into combinations for faster interpretation of the data. For Hypothesis 1 there are three 
combinations of factors drawn from the Afghanistan data: A, B, C. Hypothesis 2 has only 
one factor assigned and is identified as Combination D. Hypothesis 3 has two combinations 
of factors assigned to it identified as Combinations E and F. Hypothesis 4 has only one 
series of factors assigned to it identified and Combination G. Assigning multiple 
combinations of factors to the broader hypotheses provides multiple views on COIN  
 
 
99 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 77–78. 
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practices in an effort to determine if there is something indeed unique about COIN 
campaigns that receive external support or to understand if certain factors are more 
important than others in this type of COIN environment. 
 
 
 Hypotheses and Assigned Factors100 
D. WHERE THE FACTORS FALL IN MCCORMICK’S MODEL 
This study identified 13 factors in Figure 9 that are most relevant to the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter. Twelve of the COIN practices fall within the first three 
steps of McCormick’s Model, with one falling in step four. The outlier is associated with  
 
 
100 Adapted from: Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72; Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”  
 
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict
2 10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force
2
14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control
1 4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict
1 2. Government involves corrupt and apersonalistic rule
2 10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force
2 13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above 
historical baseline 
2
14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control
4 2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 
3 6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents
3 6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas 
1 12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas
3 7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics 
3 7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained 
1 11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment
4
1
2 2 1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors
3
McCormick's 










Hypothesis 3 and addresses the COIN force’s ability to reduce tangible support, 
which can either be provided internally or come from an external source such as a state 
sponsor.101 In the case of Afghanistan, it is common knowledge that Pakistan has provided 
both sanctuary and support to the Taliban during the conflict. For this reason, tangible 
support must include external support, not just internal support, therefore extending the 
factor into the fourth step of McCormick’s Model. However, aside from the one outlier, 
the remaining twelve factors fall into the earlier steps of McCormick’s Model. The location 
of the factors is noteworthy because the COIN force has either failed to achieve success in 
these factors or regressed over the five years. It is the first evidence suggesting there can 
be a way to sequence the elements of a COIN campaign, given the overall declining trend 
of the conflict in Afghanistan identified in the temporal analysis in Chapter III.  
E. INTERPRETING THE DATA 
The following table quantifies the historical results from the information 
consolidated in Figure 9. The table identifies each combination of factors, determines the 
frequency of the factors being present both present and absent in the 28 cases, and provides 
a success and failure rate for the factors based on these conditions. The table shows that 
for Combination A, out of the 28 cases evaluated, the combination of factors occurred in 
only six of the cases, and when it did, it yielded a success rate of 83%. When the three 
factors were simultaneously absent, it occurred 21 times, yielding a COIN failure rate of 
62%. The table indicates the challenges of realizing certain factors in counterinsurgency, 






101 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 131. 
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Table 1. 28 Cases Tested against the Hypotheses102 
 
 
F. RESULTS FROM THE COMPARISON 
Table 1, 28 Cases of External Actor-Support Counterinsurgencies, shows the 
success and failure rates of counterinsurgencies where the COIN force received varying 
levels of support from an external actor. Historically, the average COIN win rate was 50%, 
 





































Frequency Success Rate 
21 62%
28 Cases w/ External Support                    
(Factors Present)




with the average COIN loss rate at 50%.103 Of the 28 cases, 14 resulted in a COIN win, 
while the other 14 resulted in a COIN loss. Notably, the frequency of factors indicating 
military-based support was much higher than the frequency of factors expressing 
diplomatic and economic areas of emphasis, which was considerably lower. However, the 
aggregate of realizing all 13 factors resulted in an 87% success rate. When they were 
absent, the failure rate reached 64%. Arguably, using the data set provided by Paths to 
Victory allows the study to validate all four hypotheses developed from the observations 
made by modeling the conflict in Afghanistan. However, since the frequency of occurrence 
of each combination of factors is low, a counterargument to this validation is that there is 
not a sufficient data set to validate or invalidate the hypotheses. This study acknowledges 
that there is no way to achieve a data saturation level to validate or invalidate the 
hypotheses completely. However, the counterargument, while acknowledged, does not 
negate the evidence drawn from the historical cases. 
G. DETERMINING IF THE 13 FACTORS OCCURRED IN SEQUENCE 
Evaluating the fourteen COIN wins by phase provides a way to determine if a 
historical sequence occurred. This section uses the same thirteen COIN factors previously 
identified from the hypotheses to determine if a sequence was standard across external 
actor-supported counterinsurgency victories. The following three tables display the 
fourteen conflicts by the phases reported in Paths to Victory.104 Each table builds on the 
previous, where the first table displays only phase one of each conflict, while the second 
table displays phases one and two of the conflicts, and if applicable, the third table displays 
phases one, two and three. Not all of the conflicts have three phases of analysis, but for the 
study, the progression of counterinsurgency sequencing can still be evaluated given this 
limitation. In the table, the thirteen factors utilized to develop the hypothesis are displayed, 
showing the score given in Paths to Victory to each phase.105 If the corresponding block 
is green, it means the COIN force successfully addressed that factor during that phase. If it 
 
103 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 77–78. 
104 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 16. 
105 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 252–68. 
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is red, the COIN force did not succeed in addressing that factor during that phase. As tables 
introduce subsequent phases, the fourteen counterinsurgencies should address the thirteen 
factors in a similar order, given the observations and hypotheses. If the conflicts progressed 
the same way, then the tables should show patterns in how successful counterinsurgencies 
sequenced their actions.  
Table 2, Phase I of the 14 Cases is the first table presented. From the table, the two 
most common factors successfully addressed by these victorious COIN forces were Bad 
Factor 2: “Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule,” and Bad Factor 11: “COIN 
force and government have different goals/level of commitment.”106 Meaning that most 
commonly, the counterinsurgent force was able to reduce government corruption and 
maintain the unity of effort and commitment to resolving the conflict. While there are 
instances of the COIN forces not achieving these factors, it does occur in the majority of 
the cases.  
Table 2. Phase I of the 14 Cases107 
 
 
106 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 272. 







From Table 3, Phases I-II of the 14 Cases, come two key observations. The first 
observation is that COIN forces continued to maintain success in Bad Factor 2 and Bad 
Factor 11 from Phase I. The second observation is that the three factors showing the most 
improvement from Phase I to Phase II are Good Factor 2: “COIN force reduces at least 
three tangible support factors,” Good Factor 6: “COIN force of sufficient strength to force 
insurgents to fight as guerrillas,” and Bad Factor 7: “COIN force fails to adapt to changes 
in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics.”108 When combined, the COIN force, 
historically saw their most gains in the COIN force’s ability to militarily counter the 
insurgent force, while maintaining a reduction in corruption and commitment to conflict 
resolution.  
Table 4 presents Phases I-III of the 14 Cases. From this table, come two further 
observations. The first observation is that the COIN force generally continues to maintain 
success in the areas from the previous phases. The second is that while there are gains made 
by the COIN force, there is no one or any set of factors that stand out across the field. That 
is to say that each COIN force achieved success, albeit in different areas than other conflicts 
in the same category. Based on the available data, beyond the early gains made by the 
COIN forces, of the thirteen evaluated factors, the data do not show one specific sequence 
or overall approach that ultimately resulted in COIN victories. The table displays that 
beyond the initial gains made in similar areas, COIN forces achieved success in a variety 
of different ways as the conflicts matured, resulting in the COIN force victories.  
 
 
108 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72. 
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Table 3. Phases I-II of the 14 Cases109 
 
 






Table 4. Phases I-III of the 14 Cases.110 
 
 
110 Source: Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 252–58. 
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H. WHAT WAS NOT OBSERVED 
When evaluating the cases by phase, there is one distinct observation deserving 
identification and description. It is where the COIN force did not make any noticeable gain 
against the insurgency in the conflict. The lack of any success, or later success corresponds 
most noticeably to Good Factor 1: “COIN force realizes at least two strategic 
communication factors.”111 Overall, in COIN victories, it was the least affected, or the 
latest affected of the thirteen factors analyzed in this section.  
I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
This chapter conducted two forms of analysis to evaluate data to validate/invalidate 
the four hypotheses developed from the conflict in Afghanistan. The first section sought to 
determine the key elements of counterinsurgency while the second looked to determine if 
they occurred in sequence. When evaluating the key elements of counterinsurgency, the 
analysis showed that, when achieved in various combinations, the factors chosen yielded 
an 87% success rate in historical conflicts. In the second analysis, these same factors, when 
evaluated by phase, showed that while there were instances of factors occurring early in 
phases in most conflicts, most conflicts followed different paths when compared to the 
evaluated field. Finally, evaluating the conflicts by phase also highlighted what was not 
achieved by the COIN force. In all, these findings, both key elements and observation of 
sequence provide the information needed to revisit the hypotheses to determine their 
validity when attempting to answer the research question. The final chapter analyzes the 
findings.  
 
111 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270. 
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VI. ANALYZE FINDINGS AND DEVELOP 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This study set out with the goal of understanding the options for sequencing key 
elements of counterinsurgency from inception to completion for future applications to 
ensure the attainment of U.S. national objectives. The effort began for two reasons. The 
first was to provide insight of the concepts available to the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense to prevent the United States from again finding itself in an endless 
war without realization of the national objectives the engagement intended to achieve in 
the first place. The second was to determine if there is a way to arrange these concepts that 
can serve as a guideline during future diplomatic and military commitment in 
counterinsurgency environments. The origins of the study began much earlier when 
students of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School executed 
applied research on behalf of Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan 
examining the conditions to pursue a negotiated settlement, and how to measure those 
conditions accurately. During the first iteration of applied research, the team of Naval 
Postgraduate Students was able to provide an assessment of the then-current state of the 
conflict in Afghanistan. As the research continued, the requests from the forward 
headquarters naturally changed as the conflict evolved. The applied research sought to 
understand why instability and violence, in light of peace talks, continued. The research 
team used the initial assessment, and coupled with the RAND Corps data, analyzed the 
conflict in Afghanistan over five years. Here, the team at NPS, using McCormick’s 
Theoretical Model and the COIN Scorecard from Paths to Victory as the foundation¸ 
believed they were able to explain why national conditions in Afghanistan did not favor 
the government of Afghanistan / the United States-led NATO mission to negotiate a 
resolution with Taliban leaders to end the 18-year war.112  
 
112 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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The motivation for this study emerged during the analysis of the phases of the 
conflict in Afghanistan. An observation of the five years highlighted where the government 
and COIN force failed to address critical components that historically lead to success in 
counterinsurgencies. Since insurgencies are on the rise, using the war in Afghanistan to 
identify a specific set of principles of counterinsurgency and try and find the most objective 
way to sequence these activities seemed viable to answer the research question. By drawing 
on the war in Afghanistan to develop hypotheses, the study sought to use a present conflict 
to determine, with the outcome still undecided, an appropriate COIN campaign sequence. 
By testing the hypotheses against the historic cases provided by Paths to Victory, the 
research may yield information that was previously overlooked or overshadowed by other 
prevailing belief systems. In the following section, this chapter analyzes the findings and 
tests the hypotheses against the evidence to determine their validity. From this review, the 
study will see if the research question’s components were satisfied. If so, the study will 
provide recommendations for counterinsurgency for future applications. If not, it will 
highlight the areas where future research may more comprehensively address the initial 
research question. Even if this study falls short of comprehensively answering the research 
question, at a minimum, it may provide a small first step in the right direction of addressing 
the gap identified in current U.S. government instruction and doctrine. 
B. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Below the four hypotheses are revisited with an analysis of the evidence gathered 
to determine their validity, addressing both components of the research question. 
Hypotheses 1: Given observations one through four, COIN campaigns that 
prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over 
military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over COIN 
campaigns that do not.  
Discussion: Observations from the conflict in Afghanistan identified multiple areas 
where the counterinsurgent force has failed to address several areas of governmental, 
diplomatic, and economic improvements within the COIN scorecard. Three combinations 
of factors showed either neglect or regression by the COIN force over the five years. These 
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combinations, when achieved in historical conflicts, resulted in significantly higher success 
rates when compared to the baseline. However, their frequency of occurrence was so low, 
that achieving them in future conflicts is rather unlikely. So, while they may have been key 
for their cases, this study showed these combinations were not critical in all conflicts. 
Further, when the study analyzed the fourteen COIN victories by phase, there was 
little similarity in the pattern of these combinations. Evidence showed that only one factor 
in these three combinations showed any evidence of occurring early in COIN force 
victories: Bad Factor 2. “Government involves corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.”113 
The remaining factors did not occur until later in the phases, and the evidence does not 
suggest that prioritizing governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over military 
efforts will necessarily yield a higher success rate. 
Hypothesis 2: Given observation five, COIN campaigns that realize strategic 
communication factors early in the campaigns achieve their desired objectives over COIN 
campaigns that do not.  
Discussion: Observations from the Afghanistan conflict showed the inability of the 
COIN force to ever achieve strategic communication over the insurgency. One factor, 
Good Factor 1, explicitly addresses strategic communication and its effects on the outcome 
of a conflict.114 When achieved in historical cases, the results were significantly higher 
than the baseline, but again, the frequency was so low that, while it may have been critical 
for several conflicts, they were not necessary for all conflicts. Of the thirteen factors pulled 
from the conflict in Afghanistan and used in chapters IV and V of this study, Good Factor 
1 was the least and latest addressed factor in all COIN force victories. This study suggests 
that the reason for this is that the insurgency controls both the information space and the 
initiative. Professor McCormick, in his five-step model, argues that the insurgency 
competes against the counterinsurgent force for explicit control of the information space 
of the population.115 If the argument is valid, then logically, influence and ownership of 
 
113 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 272. 
114 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270. 
115 McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.” 
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strategic communication would be the least and latest factor to be achieved by the COIN 
force. For this study, though, evidence shows that the insurgency retains control of the 
information space, whether or not the COIN force succeeds.  
Hypothesis 3: Given observations one and three, tactical military superiority 
against an insurgent force, while required throughout the conflict, does not translate to 
success in a COIN campaign.  
Discussion: From the conflict in Afghanistan, this study developed two 
combinations of factors to address hypothesis three. The two combinations both yielded a 
higher success rate than the historical baseline, and occurred most frequently of all the 
combinations developed and evaluated. However, while both were higher than the baseline, 
the other combination of factors, Combination F. showed that when achieved, the historical 
success rate was 93%. It shared one factor with Combination E., Good Factor 6: “COIN 
force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas,” but its two differing 
factors ,Good Factor 12: “COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas,” and Bad 
Factor 7: “COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or 
tactics,” focus on the COIN force’s effectiveness with respect to the conflict at large, and 
not solely against the enemy.116 This view shows that while engaging and defeating the 
insurgents yields success in conflicts, decisive military action should enable non-lethal 
gains. That is to say that conducting a raid, while useful in eliminating insurgent leaders 
and materiel may not have the sustained effects of establishing area security over a 
prolonged period. When evaluated by phases, it is evident that Good Factor 6 is the third 
earliest achieved factor in the phases of the COIN force victories, while the remaining 
factors occur later in the phases at about the same frequency.117 Based on the evidence, 
tactical military superiority is necessary, but from this level of analysis, there was nothing 
in the data explicitly examining how to employ that military capability. Evidence does 
show that expanding secure areas while maintaining flexibility to adapt to the insurgent’s 
 
116 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–72. 
117 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 271. 
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strategy yields higher success that reducing tangible enemy support and initiating contact 
first on the insurgency.118  
Hypothesis 4: Given observations five and six, a shared vision and unity of purpose 
early in a COIN campaign to enables a campaign to be successful over those that do not. 
Those that do not maintain these two factors fail.  
Discussion: The conflict in Afghanistan showed that throughout the evaluated 
period from 2013–218, that at no time was unity of effort and goals/levels of commitment 
by the COIN force and government achieved.119 When established as Combination G, the 
two factors, when achieved, had the highest frequency of occurring together throughout 
the conflicts compared to all other combinations of factors. Though having the highest 
percentage of frequency, it also had the second-lowest percentage of increased success rate. 
Though higher than the 50% baseline, it only increased the rate of success in historical 
cases to 80%. The data shows that while achieving this combination was more frequent 
than other combinations, the two factors, while increasing the success rate, do not translate 
into COIN force success. When evaluating the factors by phase, evidence from the fourteen 
evaluated cases shows that Bad Factor 11: “COIN force and government have different 
goals/level of commitment” was achieved in the first phase of 10 of 14 cases.120 This factor 
also continues to persist throughout the phases, similar to Bad Factor 2. However, the 
evidence does not show that Good Factor 7: “Unity of effort/unity of command 
maintained” was all that critical to enabling a COIN campaign. It, similar to strategic 
communication, seemed to occur later in the phases, rather than earlier. Given the two 
layers of analysis and the historical cases, evidence indicates Bad Factor 11, similar to Bad 
Factor 2, is critical in achieving early in a COIN campaign, and when maintained, enables 
the COIN force to make gains in other areas. 
 
118 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 270–272. 
119 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 271–72. 
120 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 272. 
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C. OVERALL FINDINGS 
Given the evidence and the discussion of each of the four hypotheses, this study  
did not find one objective way to sequence counterinsurgency. Furthermore, the study  
was not able to provide a clearly defined set of counterinsurgency principles that  
guarantee success. Instead, data showed that in successful External Actor-Supported 
Counterinsurgencies, three of the thirteen factors were achieved earlier than others, and 
remained consistent through the life-cycle of the campaign. Arguably, when committing to 
a counterinsurgency, at minimum, the evidence suggests the United States should focus on 
realizing these factors and preserving gains, before moving on to other areas. The data also 
showed that beyond the three factors identified, COIN forces achieve success in a variety 
of ways. While particular combinations of factors, when achieved together, yielded high 
COIN win rates, the low frequencies of achieving these combinations suggest that these 
concepts do not overarchingly apply to all conflicts. However, the combinations provide 
options for prioritizing factors rather than try to tackle the remaining ten, or even twenty-
three factors of the COIN Scorecard simultaneously. Attempting to do that would most 
certainly overwhelm any staff. Selecting a few factors at a time would reduce the ambiguity 
of a counterinsurgency strategy and provide focus and direction to subordinate elements. 
Implementing this approach allows for COIN sequencing to be executed in several sets of 
a branch and sequel plans as the conflict evolves. 
Additionally, with the ability to assess the conditions on the ground using the  
COIN scorecard, it would be easy to attempt a specific combination of factors, and if  
failed, adjust to another set until the right combination was found to achieve success in 
counterinsurgency. Given the analysis of the combination of factors, a planning staff could 
determine which combination of factors to pursue by making a simple comparison of the 
frequency of occurrence to success rate to choose the best set of factors to emphasize. The 
tools in the study, if used, could allow staff to systematically attempt each set of factors 
and measure any progress or regression, maintaining an objective understanding of the 
state of the counterinsurgency campaign.  
63 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If history is precedent, in the future, the United States will find itself engaged in 
counterinsurgency efforts around the world. Given this possibility, the United States needs 
a way to measure and assess those efforts. The model developed to support Special 
Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) can and should be used as that tool 
to measure and asses those efforts. The applied research conducted for the Commander, 
SOJTF-A, validated the efficacy of the tool’s ability to accurately determine the status of 
the conflict. New challenges with the negotiations with the Taliban to bring the conflict in 
Afghanistan to a resolution is evidence to support the models’ findings that conditions did 
not favor the United States at the negotiating table.121 While future U.S. policy or grand 
strategy may force the country into COIN campaigns, the assessment tool can be used to 
recognize the challenges the Department of State and the Department of Defense will face.  
Additionally, using the tool to conduct the assessment allows policy-makers to 
manage the expectations of what may come from engaging in a counterinsurgency 
campaign. Executing an assessment of conditions preceding a future conflict, then 
comparing the data to cases available in Paths to Victory, with its 71 cases, provide 
historical examples that can illuminate the potential challenges the United States 
government and the host nation may face by committing to a COIN campaign.122 
Managing expectations forces decision-makers to scope the objectives appropriately they 
intend the COIN campaign to achieve, thus ensuring at a minimum there is unity of purpose 
and effort for the United States. Finally, the model should be used as a running estimate to 
determine what the status of future conflict is at any given time. The United States will 
always have an idea of how a counterinsurgency campaign is progressing, whether 
positively or negatively, and at a minimum, the United States government can provide 
realistic expectations to the American public. 
 
121 “U.S.-Taliban Talks End without Deal, Both Sides to Consult,” Reuters, August 12, 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-idUSKCN1V206N. 
122 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, iii. 
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E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study illuminated areas where additional future research could provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency sequencing. The study only drew on 
thirteen of the twenty-six factors from the COIN scorecard based on hypotheses created 
from analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan, yielding an aggregated success rate of 87% in 
External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies.123 While the process showed evidence 
that certain elements can be key in select situations, there was no one set of factors that 
yielded a 100% success rate with a 100% frequency rate. In evaluating the thirteen factors 
by phase, the data showed that beyond the three factors occurring earliest in successes, 
COIN forces achieved success in numerous ways. Future research should center on creating 
a model to organize all 26 factors into multiple combinations and test them against the field 
of the 71 cases to determine if a sequence of certain factors could indeed yield a 100% 
success rate and a 100% frequency rate in counterinsurgency. Doing so would provide the 
best information for determining both key elements and a projected sequence.  
Also, this study identified a gap in the guidance and doctrine of the DoS and DoD. 
The findings of the study show that counterinsurgency, with all its complexities, requires 
multiple stakeholders within the two departments. Future research should focus on 
developing the appropriate joint interagency headquarters at all necessary levels with 
supporting staff functions to adequately address the governmental, economic, 
informational, and military processes and procedures required to succeed in 
counterinsurgency. Lastly, this study used phased data provided by the authors of Paths to 
Victory to understand how conflicts evolved throughout their life-cycles. Those varied 
from conflict to conflict based on the COIN forces’ efforts to change the status of the 
conflict.124 In order for the assessment tool to benefit decision-makers, further research on 
conducting assessments using the provided tools would maximize the value gained by 
planning staff tasked with counterinsurgency efforts. Doing so would stabilize the 
 
123 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 77–78. 
124 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 16. 
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assessment process to either limit overproduction or prevent the underproduction of data 
for analysis.  
F. CONCLUSION  
Evidence indicates insurgency is on the rise, both as a form of conflict and a tool 
of foreign policy by nations opposing the United States and its interests. There is a gap in 
the ability of both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the two 
stakeholders in the U.S. government responsible for counterinsurgency, to guide planners 
in sequencing the elements of counterinsurgency to yield long-term attainment of U.S. 
national objectives. This study generated four hypotheses from the conflict in Afghanistan 
by overlaying two models together in the methods chapter to compare against historical 
cases of counterinsurgency. The analysis showed that most successful COIN campaigns 
achieve success early in three areas, but beyond these three, COIN forces have achieved 
success in a variety of ways. This study recommends that the United States should focus 
on achieving success in these three areas before moving on to other areas of the conflict. 
Once achieved, the United States government and host nation can move onto other areas. 
The data drawn from the 28 Cases of External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies 
showed multiple combinations of factors that yielded high COIN success rates, which 
provide options to pursue following the establishment of the previous conditions.125 
Systematically working through these combinations of factors gives the COIN force a way 
to apply new concepts to the campaign. Using the model in Chapter III as an assessment 
tool provides a way to measure progress and failure objectively. With this ability, the 
United States government and the host nation can adjust the strategy as needed when COIN 
practices fail. Since the model provides a way to measure progress objectively, the United 
States government will always know the status conflict, and what has and has not yielded 
success. While the study does not provide a way to sequence the key elements of a 
counterinsurgency campaign from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-
campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives, it does 
provide a starting point. While this approach may not guarantee success in 
 
125 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 77–78. 
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counterinsurgency, applying these recommendations to future conflicts will provide the 
American public and policy-makers with what the costs paid for in both blood and treasure 
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2. Philippines (Huk Rebellion).127 
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 8. South Vietnam.133 
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